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  4. Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy

Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy

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Author(s)
Carback, Richard T.
•
Chaum, David
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Clark, Jeremy
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Conway, John
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Essex, Aleksander
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Herrnson, Paul S.
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Mayberry, Travis
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Popoveniuc, Stefan
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Rivest, Ronald L.
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Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi)
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Date Issued
August 2010
Journal
UNIX Security Symposium. Proceedings 19th USENIX Security Symposium, 2010
Publisher
USENIX Association
Citation
Carback, Richard et al. "Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy" Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Security Symposium, 2010, Washington, D.C., Aug. 11-13, 2010.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system—the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election—including the improved design and implementation of the voting system, streamlined procedures, agreements with the city, and assessments of the experiences of voters and poll workers. The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end verifiability based on optional web-based voter verification of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded authorities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers. Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63143
DOI of Published Version
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec10/tech/full_papers/Carback.pdf
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