dc.contributor.author | Ashlagi, Itai | |
dc.contributor.author | Braverman, Mark | |
dc.contributor.author | Hassidim, Avinatan | |
dc.contributor.author | Lavi, Ron | |
dc.contributor.author | Tennenholtz, Moshe | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-16T17:43:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-16T17:43:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-05 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1935-1704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64459 | |
dc.description.abstract | We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able to retrieve all the desired properties of the Generalized English Auction, that was not originally designed for players with budgets. In particular, the ex-post equilibrium outcome of our auction is Pareto-efficient and envy-free. Moreover, we show that any other position auction that satisfies these properties and does not make positive transfers must obtain in ex-post equilibrium the same outcome of our mechanism, for every tuple of distinct types. This uniqueness result holds even if the players' values are fixed and known to the seller, and only the budgets are private. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Berkeley Electronic Press | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1648 | en_US |
dc.rights | Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. | en_US |
dc.source | Berkeley Electronic Press | en_US |
dc.title | Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Lavi, Ron; and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2010) "Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 20. Copyright ©2010 Berkeley Electronic Press | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Sloan School of Management | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | W. M. Keck Foundation Center for Extreme Quantum Information Theory | en_US |
dc.contributor.approver | Ashlagi, Itai | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Ashlagi, Itai | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Hassidim, Avinatan | |
dc.relation.journal | B E Journal of Theoretical Economics | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dspace.orderedauthors | Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Lavi, Ron; Tennenholtz, Moshe | en |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X | |
mit.license | PUBLISHER_POLICY | en_US |
mit.metadata.status | Complete | |