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dc.contributor.authorAshlagi, Itai
dc.contributor.authorBraverman, Mark
dc.contributor.authorHassidim, Avinatan
dc.contributor.authorLavi, Ron
dc.contributor.authorTennenholtz, Moshe
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-16T17:43:04Z
dc.date.available2011-06-16T17:43:04Z
dc.date.issued2010-05
dc.date.submitted2010-01
dc.identifier.issn1935-1704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64459
dc.description.abstractWe design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able to retrieve all the desired properties of the Generalized English Auction, that was not originally designed for players with budgets. In particular, the ex-post equilibrium outcome of our auction is Pareto-efficient and envy-free. Moreover, we show that any other position auction that satisfies these properties and does not make positive transfers must obtain in ex-post equilibrium the same outcome of our mechanism, for every tuple of distinct types. This uniqueness result holds even if the players' values are fixed and known to the seller, and only the budgets are private.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBerkeley Electronic Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1648en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceBerkeley Electronic Pressen_US
dc.titlePosition Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniquenessen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAshlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Lavi, Ron; and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2010) "Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 20. Copyright ©2010 Berkeley Electronic Pressen_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.contributor.departmentW. M. Keck Foundation Center for Extreme Quantum Information Theoryen_US
dc.contributor.approverAshlagi, Itai
dc.contributor.mitauthorAshlagi, Itai
dc.contributor.mitauthorHassidim, Avinatan
dc.relation.journalB E Journal of Theoretical Economicsen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsAshlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Lavi, Ron; Tennenholtz, Mosheen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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