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dc.contributor.authorCastilla, Emilio J.
dc.contributor.authorBenard, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-19T13:48:06Z
dc.date.available2011-09-19T13:48:06Z
dc.date.issued2010-12
dc.identifier.issn1930-3815
dc.identifier.issn0001-8392
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65884
dc.description.abstractIn this article, we develop and empirically test the theoretical argument that when an organizational culture promotes meritocracy (compared with when it does not), managers in that organization may ironically show greater bias in favor of men over equally performing women in translating employee performance evaluations into rewards and other key career outcomes; we call this the “paradox of meritocracy.” To assess this effect, we conducted three experiments with a total of 445 participants with managerial experience who were asked to make bonus, promotion, and termination recommendations for several employee profiles. We manipulated both the gender of the employees being evaluated and whether the company's core values emphasized meritocracy in evaluations and compensation. The main finding is consistent across the three studies: when an organization is explicitly presented as meritocratic, individuals in managerial positions favor a male employee over an equally qualified female employee by awarding him a larger monetary reward. This finding demonstrates that the pursuit of meritocracy at the workplace may be more difficult than it first appears and that there may be unrecognized risks behind certain organizational efforts used to reward merit. We discuss possible underlying mechanisms leading to the paradox of meritocracy effect as well as the scope conditions under which we expect the effect to occur.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipWharton Schoolen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSamuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell Universityen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.4.543en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceSFNen_US
dc.titleThe Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationCastilla, Emilio J., and Stephen Benard. “The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations.” Administrative Science Quarterly 55 (2010): 543-576. © 2010 by Johnson Graduate School, Cornell University.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.contributor.approverCastilla, Emilio J.
dc.contributor.mitauthorCastilla, Emilio J.
dc.relation.journalAdministrative Science Quarterlyen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsCastilla, Emilio J.; Benard, Stephenen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-8724-7054
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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