Leakage-resilient coin tossing
Author(s)Boyle, Elette; Goldwasser, Shafi
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The ability to collectively toss a common coin among n parties in the presence of faults is an important primitive in the arsenal of randomized distributed protocols. In the case of dishonest majority, it was shown to be impossible to achieve less than 1 r bias in O(r) rounds (Cleve STOC ’86). In the case of honest majority, in contrast, unconditionally secure O(1)-round protocols for generating common unbiased coins follow from general completeness theorems on multi-party secure protocols in the secure channels model (e.g., BGW, CCD STOC ’88). However, in the O(1)-round protocols with honest majority, parties generate and hold secret values which are assumed to be perfectly hidden from malicious parties: an assumption which is crucial to proving the resulting common coin is unbiased. This assumption unfortunately does not seem to hold in practice, as attackers can launch side-channel attacks on the local state of honest parties and leak information on their secrets. In this work, we present an O(1)-round protocol for collectively generating an unbiased common coin, in the presence of leakage on the local state of the honest parties. We tolerate t ≤ ( 1 3 − )n computationallyunbounded Byzantine faults and in addition a Ω(1)-fraction leakage on each (honest) party’s secret state. Our results hold in the memory leakage model (of Akavia, Goldwasser, Vaikuntanathan ’08) adapted to the distributed setting. Additional contributions of our work are the tools we introduce to achieve the collective coin toss: a procedure for disjoint committee election, and leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing.
Proceedings 25th International Symposium, DISC 2011, Rome, Italy, September 20-22, 2011.
DepartmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Boyle, Elette, Shafi Goldwasser, and Yael Tauman Kalai. “Leakage-Resilient Coin Tossing.” Distributed Computing. Ed. David Peleg. Vol. 6950. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. 181-196. © 2011 Springer
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