A note on strictly competitive games
Author(s)
Adler, Ilan; Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christos H.
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Strictly competitive games are a class of 2-player games often quoted in the literature to be a proper generalization of zero-sum games. Other times it is claimed, e.g. by Aumann, that strictly competitive games are only payoff transformations of zero-sum games. But to the best of our knowledge there is no proof of such claim. We shed light to this point of confusion in the literature, showing that any strictly competitive game is indeed a payoff transformation of a zero sum-game; in fact, an affine transformation. We offer two proofs of this fact, one combinatorial and one algebraic.
Description
5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings
Date issued
2009-12Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryJournal
Internet and Network Economics
Publisher
Spring Berlin/Heidelberg
Citation
Adler, Ilan, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. “A Note on Strictly Competitive Games.” Internet and Network Economics. Ed. Stefano Leonardi. Vol. 5929. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. 471-474.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISBN
978-3-642-10840-2
ISSN
0302-9743
1611-3349