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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.authorEgorov, Georgy
dc.contributor.authorSonin, Konstantin
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-16T13:44:53Z
dc.date.available2012-08-16T13:44:53Z
dc.date.issued
dc.date.submitted2011-05
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.issn1944-7981
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72166
dc.description.abstractA central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution paves the way for further changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems. Under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions, we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness. The explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision-making: (1) a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society; (2) efficiency- enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender. Finally, we apply this framework to the analysis of the dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleDynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAcemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs." American Economic Review 102.4 (June 2012) pp.1446-76.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.approverAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.mitauthorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsAcemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantinen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


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