A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

dc.contributor.advisor	Silvio Micali
dc.contributor.author	Chiesa, Alessandro	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Micali, Silvio	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhu, Zeyuan Allen	en_US
dc.contributor.other	Theory of Computation	en
dc.date.accessioned	2012-09-07T22:15:03Z
dc.date.available	2012-09-07T22:15:03Z
dc.date.issued	2012-09-07
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72584
dc.description.abstract	We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one.	en_US
dc.format.extent	19 p.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028
dc.subject	Knightian Auctions	en_US
dc.subject	Probabilistic Mechanisms	en_US
dc.subject	Social Welfare	en_US
dc.title	A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions	en_US