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dc.contributor.authorSkow, Bradford
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T15:13:33Z
dc.date.available2012-09-28T15:13:33Z
dc.date.issued2011-12
dc.identifier.issn1520-8583
dc.identifier.issn1520-8583
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73471
dc.description.abstractSome philosophers believe that the passage of time is a real phenomenon. And some of them find a reason to believe this when they attend to features of their conscious experience. In fact this “argument from experience” is supposed to be one of the main arguments for passage. What exactly does this argument look like? Is it any good? There are in fact many different arguments from experience. I am not sure I understand them all. In this paper I want to talk about the three most interesting arguments that I do understand. I am going to argue that all three of them fail.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWiley Blackwell (Blackwell Publishing)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00220.xen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleExperience and the passage of timeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSkow, Bradford. “EXPERIENCE AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME.” Philosophical Perspectives 25.1 (2011): 359–387.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSkow, Bradford
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Perspectivesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsSkow, Bradforden
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CCen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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