Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation
Author(s)Vaze, Vikrant; Barnhart, Cynthia
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Demand often exceeds capacity at congested airports. Airline frequency competition is partially responsible for the growing demand for airport resources. We propose a game-theoretic model for airline frequency competition under slot constraints. The model is solved to obtain a Nash equilibrium using a successive optimizations approach, wherein individual optimizations are performed using a dynamic programming-based technique. The model predictions are validated against actual frequency data, with the results indicating a close fit to reality. We use the model to evaluate different strategic slot allocation schemes from the perspectives of the airlines and the passengers. The most significant result of this research shows that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in flight and passenger delays and also a considerable improvement in airlines' profits.
DepartmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Engineering
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Vaze, V., and C. Barnhart. “Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation.” Transportation Science 46.4 (2012): 512–535.
Author's final manuscript