On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels

Author(s)
Pirandola, Stefano; Braunstein, Samuel L.; Lloyd, Seth
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Abstract
We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
Date issued
2009
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics
Journal
Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Citation
Pirandola, Stefano, Samuel L. Braunstein, and Seth Lloyd. On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISBN
978-3-642-10697-2
978-3-642-10698-9
ISSN
0302-9743
1611-3349
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