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dc.contributor.authorKoster-Hale, Jorie
dc.contributor.authorSaxe, Rebecca R.
dc.contributor.authorDungan, James
dc.contributor.authorYoung, Liane L.
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-03T16:54:25Z
dc.date.available2013-10-03T16:54:25Z
dc.date.issued2013-03
dc.date.submitted2012-05
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424
dc.identifier.issn1091-6490
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81292
dc.description.abstractIntentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants’ moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSimons Foundationen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant 095518)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipJohn Merck Scholars Program (Grant)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCharles A. Dana Foundationen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.). Graduate Research Fellowship Program (Grant 0645960)en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciences (U.S.)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1207992110en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourcePNASen_US
dc.titleDecoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationKoster-Hale, J., R. Saxe, J. Dungan, and L. L. Young. “Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 14 (April 2, 2013): 5648-5653.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciencesen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMcGovern Institute for Brain Research at MITen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorKoster-Hale, Jorieen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSaxe, Rebecca R.en_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsKoster-Hale, J.; Saxe, R.; Dungan, J.; Young, L. L.en_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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