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dc.contributor.authorWerning, Ivan
dc.contributor.authorFarhi, Emmanuel
dc.contributor.authorSleet, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorYeltekin, Sevin
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-09T13:13:23Z
dc.date.available2013-12-09T13:13:23Z
dc.date.issued2012-01
dc.date.submitted2011-10
dc.identifier.issn0034-6527
dc.identifier.issn1467-937X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82875
dc.description.abstractWe study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds001en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceOther univ. web domainen_US
dc.titleNonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitmenten_US
dc.title.alternativeNon-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitmenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationFarhi, E., C. Sleet, I. Werning, and S. Yeltekin. “Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment.” The Review of Economic Studies 79, no. 4 (October 18, 2012): 1469-1493.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorWerning, Ivanen_US
dc.relation.journalThe Review of Economic Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsFarhi, E.; Sleet, C.; Werning, I.; Yeltekin, S.en_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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