Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorZhu, Haoxiang
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-30T14:03:55Z
dc.date.available2014-06-30T14:03:55Z
dc.date.issued2013-12
dc.identifier.issn0893-9454
dc.identifier.issn1465-7368
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88124
dc.description.abstractDark pools are equity trading systems that do not publicly display orders. Dark pools offer potential price improvements but do not guarantee execution. Informed traders tend to trade in the same direction, crowd on the heavy side of the market, and face a higher execution risk in the dark pool, relative to uninformed traders. Consequently, exchanges are more attractive to informed traders, and dark pools are more attractive to uninformed traders. Under certain conditions, adding a dark pool alongside an exchange concentrates price-relevant information into the exchange and improves price discovery. Improved price discovery coincides with reduced exchange liquidity.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht078en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSSRNen_US
dc.titleDo Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationZhu, H. “Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?” Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 3 (March 1, 2014): 747–789.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorZhu, Haoxiangen_US
dc.relation.journalReview of Financial Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsZhu, H.en_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5330-3441
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record