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dc.contributor.authorSun, Shi-Hai
dc.contributor.authorXu, Feihu
dc.contributor.authorJiang, Mu-Sheng
dc.contributor.authorMa, Xiang-Chun
dc.contributor.authorLo, Hoi-Kwong
dc.contributor.authorLiang, Lin-Mei
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-05T11:38:34Z
dc.date.available2015-08-05T11:38:34Z
dc.date.issued2015-08
dc.date.submitted2015-01
dc.identifier.issn1050-2947
dc.identifier.issn1094-1622
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98020
dc.description.abstractThe security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak-coherent-state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV) QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Natural Science Foundation (China) (Grant 11304391)en_US
dc.publisherAmerican Physical Societyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.92.022304en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceAmerican Physical Societyen_US
dc.titleEffect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptographyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSun, Shi-Hai, Feihu Xu, Mu-Sheng Jiang, Xiang-Chun Ma, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Lin-Mei Liang. "Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography." Phys. Rev. A 92, 022304 (August 2015). © 2015 American Physical Societyen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorXu, Feihuen_US
dc.relation.journalPhysical Review Aen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2015-08-04T22:00:10Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderAmerican Physical Society
dspace.orderedauthorsSun, Shi-Hai; Xu, Feihu; Jiang, Mu-Sheng; Ma, Xiang-Chun; Lo, Hoi-Kwong; Liang, Lin-Meien_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US


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