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Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks

Author(s)
Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
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Abstract
We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient.
Date issued
2011-09
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98852
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Abreu, Dilip, and Mihai Manea. “Markov Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks.” Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 1 (May 2012): 1–16.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
08998256
1090-2473

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