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dc.contributor.authorSpunt, Robert P.
dc.contributor.authorElison, Jed T.
dc.contributor.authorDufour, Nicholas
dc.contributor.authorAdolphs, Ralph
dc.contributor.authorHurlemann, Rene
dc.contributor.authorSaxe, Rebecca R.
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-01T12:54:23Z
dc.date.available2015-10-01T12:54:23Z
dc.date.issued2015-04
dc.date.submitted2014-12
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424
dc.identifier.issn1091-6490
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99119
dc.description.abstractThe amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM—false-belief reasoning—suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipDella Martin Foundationen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Institute of Mental Health (U.S.)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipDavid & Lucile Packard Foundationen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSimons Foundationen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciences (U.S.)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1422679112en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceNational Academy of Sciences (U.S.)en_US
dc.titleAmygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoningen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSpunt, Robert P., Jed T. Elison, Nicholas Dufour, Rene Hurlemann, Rebecca Saxe, and Ralph Adolphs. “Amygdala Lesions Do Not Compromise the Cortical Network for False-Belief Reasoning.” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112, no. 15 (March 30, 2015): 4827–4832.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciencesen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDufour, Nicholasen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSaxe, Rebecca R.en_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsSpunt, Robert P.; Elison, Jed T.; Dufour, Nicholas; Hurlemann, Rene; Saxe, Rebecca; Adolphs, Ralphen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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