Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
Name
Ticker_Privacy regulation.pdf
Size
893.44 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
782d8e79dd48decf3ba5fe265ccd814e
Author(s)
Campbell, James
Goldfarb, Avi
Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
Date Issued
February 2015
Journal
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Publisher
Wiley Blackwell
Citation
Campbell, James, Avi Goldfarb, and Catherine Tucker. “Privacy Regulation and Market Structure.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 1 (February 10, 2015): 47–73.
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12079
