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dc.contributor.authorDeckelbaum, Alan
dc.contributor.authorTzamos, Christos
dc.contributor.authorDaskalakis, Konstantinos
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-20T18:26:59Z
dc.date.available2015-11-20T18:26:59Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-61197-338-9
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-61197-340-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99968
dc.description.abstractMyerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless zpp ⊇ P[superscript #P]. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow-interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAlfred P. Sloan Foundation (Fellowship)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMicrosoft Research (Faculty Fellowship)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (CAREER Award CCF-0953960)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-1101491)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipHertz Foundation (Daniel Stroock Fellowship)en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSociety for Industrial and Applied Mathematicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973402.96en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourcearXiven_US
dc.titleThe Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Designen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationDaskalakis, Constantinos, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos. “The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design.” Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (December 18, 2013): 1302–1318.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDaskalakis, Konstantinosen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDeckelbaum, Alanen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorTzamos, Christosen_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithmsen_US
dc.eprint.versionOriginal manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsDaskalakis, Constantinos; Deckelbaum, Alan; Tzamos, Christosen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


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