The epistemic significance of experience

Author(s)
Byrne, Alex
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Abstract
According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
Date issued
2015-08
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103433
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Byrne, Alex. “The Epistemic Significance of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 4 (August 25, 2015): 947–967.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0031-8116
1573-0883
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