| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alex | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-01T18:23:35Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-01T18:23:35Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-08 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8116 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1573-0883 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103433 | |
| dc.description.abstract | According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer Netherlands | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0537-7 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | Springer Netherlands | en_US |
| dc.title | The epistemic significance of experience | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Byrne, Alex. “The Epistemic Significance of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 4 (August 25, 2015): 947–967. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Byrne, Alex | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Philosophical Studies | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2016-05-23T12:08:01Z | |
| dc.language.rfc3066 | en | |
| dc.rights.holder | Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Byrne, Alex | en_US |
| dspace.embargo.terms | N | en |
| dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 | |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
| mit.metadata.status | Complete | |
