Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism

Author(s)
Spencer II, John Haven
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Abstract
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility.
Date issued
2016-04
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104877
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.” Mind 125.498 (2016): 511–539.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0026-4423
1460-2113
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