| dc.contributor.author | Spencer II, John Haven | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-10-20T16:36:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-10-20T16:36:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-04 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0026-4423 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1460-2113 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104877 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv150 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
| dc.title | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Spencer, Jack. “Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.” Mind 125.498 (2016): 511–539. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Spencer II, John Haven | |
| dc.relation.journal | Mind | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Spencer, Jack | en_US |
| dspace.embargo.terms | N | en_US |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
