Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?

Author(s)
Skow, Bradford
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Abstract
There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts.
Date issued
2015-03
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Citation
Skow, B. “Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66.1 (2015): 69–93.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0007-0882
1464-3537
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