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dc.contributor.authorSkow, Bradford
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-20T18:49:22Z
dc.date.available2016-10-20T18:49:22Z
dc.date.issued2015-03
dc.identifier.issn0007-0882
dc.identifier.issn1464-3537
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887
dc.description.abstractThere are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt038en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleAre There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSkow, B. “Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66.1 (2015): 69–93.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSkow, Bradford
dc.relation.journalThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsSkow, B.en_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


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