In defense of moral testimony

Author(s)
Sliwa, Pauline A.
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Abstract
Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there’s something wrong with basing one’s moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn’t any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.
Date issued
2012-03
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106221
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies 158, no. 2 (March 2012): 175–195. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0031-8116
1573-0883
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