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dc.contributor.authorSliwa, Pauline A.
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-06T00:09:11Z
dc.date.available2017-01-06T00:09:11Z
dc.date.issued2012-03
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.issn1573-0883
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106221
dc.description.abstractMoral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there’s something wrong with basing one’s moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn’t any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.titleIn defense of moral testimonyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies 158, no. 2 (March 2012): 175–195. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSliwa, Pauline A.
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2016-08-18T15:20:12Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderSpringer Science+Business Media B.V.
dspace.orderedauthorsSliwa, Paulinaen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US


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