Able to Do the Impossible

Author(s)
Spencer II, John Haven
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Abstract
According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to Φ only if it is metaphysically possible for S to Φ. I argue against the poss-abilityprinciple by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
Date issued
2016-09
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115372
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Able to Do the Impossible.” Mind 126, 502 (September 2016): 466–497 © 2016 Spencer
Version: Original manuscript
ISSN
0026-4423
1460-2113
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