| dc.contributor.author | Spencer II, John Haven | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-14T19:58:35Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-14T19:58:35Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-09 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0026-4423 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1460-2113 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115372 | |
| dc.description.abstract | According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to Φ only if it is metaphysically possible for S to Φ. I argue against the poss-abilityprinciple by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/MIND/FZV183 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT Web Domain | en_US |
| dc.title | Able to Do the Impossible | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Spencer, Jack. “Able to Do the Impossible.” Mind 126, 502 (September 2016): 466–497 © 2016 Spencer | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Spencer II, John Haven | |
| dc.relation.journal | Mind | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Original manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2018-05-14T13:39:38Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Spencer, Jack | en_US |
| dspace.embargo.terms | N | en_US |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
