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dc.contributor.authorMossel, Elchanan
dc.contributor.authorMueller-Frank, Manuel
dc.contributor.authorSly, Allan
dc.contributor.authorTamuz, Omer
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-01T13:55:46Z
dc.date.available2020-06-01T13:55:46Z
dc.date.issued2019-10
dc.identifier.isbn9781450358293
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125593
dc.description.abstractWe consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish strong equilibrium properties on agreement, herding, and information aggregation. Keywords: Consensus; Information Aggregation; Herdingen_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherACMen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219207en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourcearXiven_US
dc.titleSocial Learning Equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationMossel, Elchanan et al., "Social Learning Equilibria." EC '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), June 2018, Ithaca NY, Association for Computing Machinery, 2019en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematicsen_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computationen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2019-11-18T12:52:34Z
dspace.date.submission2019-11-18T12:52:39Z
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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