The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission

Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Thumbnail
Download11098_2021_1627_ReferencePDF.pdf (893.9Kb)
Open Access Policy
Terms of use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible.
Date issued
2021-03
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/132936
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Spencer, J. The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission. Philos Stud 178, 3819–3842 (2021)
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
1573-0883
0031-8116
Collections