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dc.contributor.authorSpencer, Jack
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T18:57:29Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T18:57:29Z
dc.date.issued2021-03
dc.date.submitted2021-03
dc.identifier.issn1573-0883
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/132936
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01627-yen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.titleThe procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permissionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSpencer, J. The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission. Philos Stud 178, 3819–3842 (2021)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2021-10-09T03:17:29Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
dspace.embargo.termsY
dspace.date.submission2021-10-09T03:17:29Z
mit.journal.volume178en_US
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work Neededen_US


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