DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows
Author(s)
Lu, Chen David; Bhat, Sanjit; Kwon, Albert Hyukjae; Devadas, Srinivas
DownloadAccepted version (1021.Kb)
Terms of use
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Website fingerprinting attacks enable a local adversary to determine which website a Tor user visits. In recent years, several researchers have proposed defenses to counter these attacks. However, these defenses have shortcomings: many do not provide formal guarantees of security, incur high latency and bandwidth overheads, and require a frequently-updated database of website traffic patterns. In this work, we introduce a new countermeasure, DynaFlow, based on dynamically-adjusting flows to protect against website finger-printing. DynaFlow provides a similar level of security as current state-of-the-art while being over 40% more efficient. At the same time, DynaFlow does not require a pre-established database and extends protection to dynamically-generated websites.
Date issued
2018-01Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer SciencePublisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Citation
Lu, David, Bhat, Sanjit, Kwon, Albert and Devadas, Srinivas. 2018. "DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows."
Version: Author's final manuscript