All-pay auctions as models for military annexation

Author(s)
Kang, Benjamin; Unwin, James
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Abstract
Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios.
Date issued
2022-05-13
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Citation
Kang, Benjamin and Unwin, James. 2022. "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation."
Version: Author's final manuscript
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