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dc.contributor.authorKang, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorUnwin, James
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-27T14:57:39Z
dc.date.available2022-07-27T14:57:39Z
dc.date.issued2022-05-13
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067
dc.description.abstractAbstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Berlin Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceSpringer Berlin Heidelbergen_US
dc.titleAll-pay auctions as models for military annexationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationKang, Benjamin and Unwin, James. 2022. "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation."
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2022-07-27T03:25:47Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
dspace.embargo.termsY
dspace.date.submission2022-07-27T03:25:46Z
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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