Legal causation*

Author(s)
Byrne, Thomas
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Abstract
I propose a new formalist account of legal (/proximate) causation – one that holds legal causation to be a matter of amoral, descriptive fact. The account starts with a metaphysical relation, akin to but distinct from common-sense causation, and it argues that legal causation aligns exactly with that relation; it is unified and principled.
Date issued
2022-10-14
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163781
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Jurisprudence
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Byrne, T. (2022). Legal causation*. Jurisprudence, 14(1), 55–75.
Version: Final published version
ISSN
2040-3313
2040-3321
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