| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Thomas | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-11-20T17:04:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-11-20T17:04:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-10-14 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2040-3313 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2040-3321 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163781 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I propose a new formalist account of legal (/proximate) causation – one that holds legal causation to be a matter of amoral, descriptive fact. The account starts with a metaphysical relation, akin to but distinct from common-sense causation, and it argues that legal causation aligns exactly with that relation; it is unified and principled. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2022.2119014 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.title | Legal causation* | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Byrne, T. (2022). Legal causation*. Jurisprudence, 14(1), 55–75. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Jurisprudence | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2022.2119014 | |
| dspace.date.submission | 2025-11-20T16:58:08Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 14 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 1 | en_US |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_CC | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed | en_US |
