Transparency, Belief, Intention

Author(s)
Byrne, Alex
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Abstract
This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one’s own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one’s intentions. How do I know my own mental acts? How do I know what I just decided; how do I know what I believe, what I suspect, what I intend to do? These are one and all silly questions. Vendler, Res Cogitans
Date issued
2011-05
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61987
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
Citation
Byrne, Alex. "Transparency, Belief, Intention." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 85, Issue 1, pages 201–221, June 2011.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0309-7013
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