| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alex | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-30T13:51:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-03-30T13:51:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-05 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0309-7013 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61987 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one’s
own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the
account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one’s
intentions.
How do I know my own mental acts? How do I know what I just decided; how do I know
what I believe, what I suspect, what I intend to do? These are one and all silly questions.
Vendler, Res Cogitans | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
| dc.title | Transparency, Belief, Intention | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Byrne, Alex. "Transparency, Belief, Intention." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 85, Issue 1, pages 201–221, June 2011. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.contributor.approver | Byrne, Alex | |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Byrne, Alex | |
| dc.relation.journal | Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper | en_US |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Byrne, Alex | |
| dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 | |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
| mit.metadata.status | Complete | |
