Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain

Author(s)
Byrne, Alex
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Abstract
1 Pain perception Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of Armstrong and Pitcher.
Date issued
2011-09
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70542
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
Citation
Byrne, Alex. “Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain.” Philosophical Studies (2011): p. 1-8.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0031-8116
1573-0883
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