dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alex | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-09T15:23:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-05-09T15:23:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-09 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8116 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-0883 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70542 | |
dc.description.abstract | 1 Pain perception
Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable
difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to
dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is
devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of
Armstrong and Pitcher. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Springer Science + Business Media B.V. | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5 | en_US |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | en_US |
dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
dc.title | Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Byrne, Alex. “Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain.” Philosophical Studies (2011): p. 1-8. | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.approver | Byrne, Alexander | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Byrne, Alex | |
dc.relation.journal | Philosophical Studies | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dspace.orderedauthors | Byrne, Alex | en |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 | |
mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
mit.metadata.status | Complete | |