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dc.contributor.authorByrne, Alex
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-09T15:23:54Z
dc.date.available2012-05-09T15:23:54Z
dc.date.issued2011-09
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.issn1573-0883
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70542
dc.description.abstract1 Pain perception Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of Armstrong and Pitcher.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Science + Business Media B.V.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleHmm… Hill on the paradox of painen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationByrne, Alex. “Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain.” Philosophical Studies (2011): p. 1-8.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.approverByrne, Alexander
dc.contributor.mitauthorByrne, Alex
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsByrne, Alexen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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