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dc.contributor.authorAdida, Ben
dc.contributor.authorChau, David
dc.contributor.authorHohenberger, Susan
dc.contributor.authorRivest, Ronald L.
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-28T14:36:29Z
dc.date.available2014-05-28T14:36:29Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-540-38081-8
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-540-38080-1
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87551
dc.description.abstractWe present Lightweight Email Signatures (LES), a simple cryptographic architecture for authenticating email. LES is an extension of DKIM, the recent IETF effort to standardize domain-based email signatures. LES shares DKIM’s ease of deployment: they both use the DNS to distribute a single public key for each domain. Importantly, LES supports common uses of email that DKIM jeopardizes: multiple email personalities, firewalled ISPs, incoming-only email forwarding services, and other common uses that often require sending email via a third-party SMTP server. In addition, LES does not require DKIM’s implied intra-domain mechanism for authenticating users when they send email. LES provides these features using identity-based signatures. Each domain authority generates a master keypair, publishes the public component in the DNS, and stores the private component securely. Using this private component, the authority delivers to each of its users, via email, an individual secret key whose identity string corresponds to the user’s email address. A sender then signs messages using this individual secret key. A recipient verifies such a signature by querying the appropriate master public key from the DNS, computing the sender’s public key, and verifying the signature accordingly. As an added bonus, the widespread availability of user-level public keys enables deniable authentication, such as ring signatures. Thus, LES provides email authentication with optional repudiability. We built a LES prototype to determine its practicality. Basic user tests show that the system is relatively easy to use, and that cryptographic performance, even when using deniable authentication, is well within acceptable range.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAmerican Society for Engineering Education. National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowshipen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Berlin Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11832072_20en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceSpringeren_US
dc.titleLightweight Email Signatures (Extended Abstract)en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAdida, Ben, David Chau, Susan Hohenberger, and Ronald L. Rivest. "Lightweight Email Signatures (Extended Abstract)." R. De Prisco and M. Yung (Eds.). Security and Cryptography for Networks: 5th International Conference, SCN 2006, Maiori, Italy, September 6-8, 2006. Proceedings. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; Volume 4116), 2006, pp 288-302. © Springer 2006.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratoryen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorAdida, Benen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorChau, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorRivest, Ronald L.en_US
dc.relation.journalSecurity and Cryptography for Networksen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsAdida, Ben; Chau, David; Hohenberger, Susan; Rivest, Ronald L.en_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7105-3690
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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