Betrayal as Market Barrier: Identity-Based Limits to Diversification among High-Status Corporate Law Firms
Author(s)
Phillips, Damon J.; Turco, Catherine; Zuckerman Sivan, Ezra W.
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Why are some diversified market identities problematic but others are not? We examine this question in the context of high-status corporate law firms, which often diversify into one low-status area of work—family law (FL)—but face a barrier (strong disapproval from existing clients) that prevents diversification into another such area—plaintiffs’ personal injury law (PIL). Drawing on a qualitative study of the Boston legal market, we argue that this barrier reflects a situation where loyalty norms have been violated, and it surfaces because service to individual plaintiffs is tantamount to betraying the interests of corporate clients. Our analysis clarifies identity-based limits to diversification, indicating that they are rooted in concerns about the firm’s commitments as well as its capabilities, and suggests a more general refinement of theory on status and conformity.
Date issued
2013-01Department
Sloan School of ManagementJournal
American Journal of Sociology
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Phillips, Damon J., Catherine J. Turco, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. “Betrayal as Market Barrier: Identity-Based Limits to Diversification Among High-Status Corporate Law Firms.” American Journal of Sociology 118, no. 4 (January 2013): 1023–1054. © 2013 The University of Chicago Press
Version: Final published version
ISSN
00029602
15375390