Simultaneous Ad Auctions

Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
Thumbnail
DownloadAshlagi_Simultaneous Ad.pdf (354.7Kb)
OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
Terms of use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.
Date issued
2011-02
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74596
Department
Sloan School of Management
Journal
Mathematics of Operations Research
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Citation
Ashlagi, I., D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz. “Simultaneous Ad Auctions.” Mathematics of Operations Research 36.1 (2011): 1–13. Web.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0364-765X
1526-5471
Collections