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dc.contributor.authorAshlagi, Itai
dc.contributor.authorMonderer, Dov
dc.contributor.authorTennenholtz, Moshe
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-08T15:24:26Z
dc.date.available2012-11-08T15:24:26Z
dc.date.issued2011-02
dc.date.submitted2010-11
dc.identifier.issn0364-765X
dc.identifier.issn1526-5471
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74596
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleSimultaneous Ad Auctionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAshlagi, I., D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz. “Simultaneous Ad Auctions.” Mathematics of Operations Research 36.1 (2011): 1–13. Web.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorAshlagi, Itai
dc.relation.journalMathematics of Operations Researchen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsAshlagi, I.; Monderer, D.; Tennenholtz, M.en
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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