dc.contributor.author | Ashlagi, Itai | |
dc.contributor.author | Monderer, Dov | |
dc.contributor.author | Tennenholtz, Moshe | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-08T15:24:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-11-08T15:24:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-02 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-11 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0364-765X | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1526-5471 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74596 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475 | en_US |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | en_US |
dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
dc.title | Simultaneous Ad Auctions | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Ashlagi, I., D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz. “Simultaneous Ad Auctions.” Mathematics of Operations Research 36.1 (2011): 1–13. Web. | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Sloan School of Management | en_US |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Ashlagi, Itai | |
dc.relation.journal | Mathematics of Operations Research | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dspace.orderedauthors | Ashlagi, I.; Monderer, D.; Tennenholtz, M. | en |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X | |
mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
mit.metadata.status | Complete | |