This is an archived course. A more recent version may be available at ocw.mit.edu.

Lecture Notes

Lec # topics
1 Introduction (PDF)
2 Static Games (PDF)
3 The Nash Equilibrium and Mixed Strategies (PDF)
4 Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium (PDF)
5 Existence of NE, Pricing Congestion Game (PDF)
6 Existence of Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (PDF)
7 Supermodular Games (PDF)
8 Potential Games (PDF)
9 Computing Equilibria in Games
10 Learning in Games (PDF)
11 Fictitious Play and Extensions (PDF)
12 Extensions of Fictitious Play (PDF)
13 Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information (PDF)
14 Ultimatum Game, Rubinstein-Stahl Model of Bargaining (PDF)
15 Nash Bargaining Solution (PDF)
16 Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring (PDF)
17 Repeated Games, Folk Theorems (PDF)
18 Static games with Incomplete Information, Bayesian NE (PDF)
19 Auctions, Revenue Equivalence Principle (PDF)
20 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle (PDF)
21 Optimal Mechanisms, Efficient Mechanisms (VCG) (PDF)
22 VCG Applications, Budget Balancing (PDF)
23 Guest Lecture
24-25 Project Presentations
  Final Papers